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This article investigates the incidence of agglomeration externalities in Ecuador, a small-
sized, middle-income developing country. In particular, we analyze the role of the 
informal sector within these relations, since informal employment accounts for a 
significant part of total employment in the developing countries. Using individual level 
data and instrumental variable techniques, we investigate the impact of spatial 
externalities, in terms of population density, local specialization and urban size, on the 
wages of workers in Ecuadorian cities. The results show that spatial externalities matter 
also for a small developing country. Moreover, analysis of the interaction between 
spatial externalities and informality shows that, on average, workers employed in the 
informal sector do not enjoy significant benefits from agglomeration externalities. 
Finally, by investigating the possible channels behind spatial agglomeration gains we 
show that the advantages from agglomeration for formal sector workers may well be 
accounted for by better job-quality matches and, to a lesser extent, by learning 
externalities. For informal sector workers, our findings also suggest possible gains from 
job changes, which offset a penalty for remaining employed in the same occupation.    
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With the growth of big cities, analysis of the benefits of agglomeration economies has 
been pursued in a wide range of studies. From the empirical point of view, an extensive 
literature has analyzed the extent of agglomeration economies, measured by density (or 
population size) and industrial specialization at the local level. Their results have shown 
positive impacts of spatial externalities on productivity and wages (see among others 
Combes, 2000; Combes et al., 2008; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009).  
These studies have generally been carried out on developed countries. Less attention 
has been paid to the role of agglomeration economies in the developing world. However, 
the topic is relevant since the growth rate of the world’s urban development is being 
driven by urbanization in the developing world. Exploring the role of agglomeration 
economies in the developing countries is relevant to assessing the importance of urban 
economies worldwide, since the urbanization process taking place in the developing 
world is different from the old urbanization, mainly because of high poverty rates and 
poor-quality institutions (Glaeser and Henderson, 2017).  
A few studies have looked into the importance of agglomeration economies in the 
developing countries, focusing on those characterized by great geographical extension 
and large populations, such as China, India, Brazil or Colombia (see Chauvin et al., 2017; 
Combes et al., 2015 and Duranton, 2016). The findings have shown an important role for 
spatial externalities in fostering productivity and wages, with impacts higher than 
detected for the developed world. However, these results have been found for emerging 
market economies, while there is no evidence of studies focusing on other types of 
developing countries. Moreover, the developing countries are generally characterized 
by a large proportion of informal economy, which leads to a dual labour market (Fields, 
1990; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Although the theoretical implications of the presence 
of informal employment on agglomeration externalities are unclear, it is hardly justified 
to assume that agglomeration economies are non-existent in the informal sector 
(Overman and Venables, 2005). Moreover, as Duranton (2009) points out, formal and 
informal sectors have strong interconnections, thus suggesting that in both sectors 
agglomeration effects generate benefits. Nonetheless, more formal studies on this topic 
are lacking (Overman and Venables, 2005). 
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The aim of this paper is twofold. First of all, we analyze the importance of 
agglomeration economies for a small-sized, middle-income developing economy, 
namely that of Ecuador. This country is shaped by a set of characteristics still unexplored 
in the literature such as limited geographical extension and population size, medium 
per-capita income, low and increasing urbanization rate, weak industrial activity, and 
widespread informal employment. Our first goal is to understand whether 
agglomeration externalities exert impacts similar to those detected for the developed 
world and/or the emerging economies. Secondly, we analyze the importance of the 
informal sector within these relations, exploring the heterogeneity of spatial externalities 
between formal and informal sector workers. Also, we shed light on the channels behind 
the detected impacts. Our paper contributes to the literature by directly and 
comprehensively analyzing how spatial externalities affect formal and informal workers 
in a small developing country.  
We use repeated quarterly cross-section data from the Ecuadorean Labour Surveys 
(ENEMDU) available from 2007 to 2017, together with historical data from the 1950 and 
1990 censuses. We take Functional Urban Areas as units of analysis, since they represent 
a suitable economic definition of cities (OECD, 2013). We assess the extent of spatial 
externalities by analyzing the impact of two main measures of agglomeration on 
individual workers’ real wages: population density and sector specialization at the local 
level. We also take into account the area covered by the Functional Urban Areas, which 
allow for assessment of the impact of urban size for any given level of density.  
Two major methodological issues arise in estimating this relationship. First, there 
could be sorting of workers should the more skilled individuals prove more likely to be 
located in highly agglomerated areas. The best methodological approach would be to 
employ fixed effects estimates to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
(Combes et al., 2008; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). However, in the context of developing 
countries individual panel data are generally not available (as in the case of Chauvin et 
al., 2017; Combes et al., 2015; Duranton, 2016). This is also the case of Ecuador. 
Nonetheless, we will do our best from a methodological point of view to address this 
issue. The second methodological concern is the endogeneity due to possible 
simultaneity in individual choices concerning wages and locations. We will take this 
issue into account by applying an instrumental variable strategy, using deeply lagged 
values of our agglomeration measures to build our instruments as in Combes et al. 
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(2008), Combes et al. (2010), Matano and Naticchioni (2012), and Mion and Naticchioni 
(2009).  
Our results lead us to the following findings. First, agglomeration externalities 
increase productivity and wages in a small developing country like Ecuador. In 
particular, with regard to urbanization externalities, we find an elasticity estimate for 
density of 7.1%, whose impact is partly due to a pure size effect. These findings are in 
line with those found for emerging economies (Chauvin et al., 2017; Combes et al., 2015; 
Duranton, 2016). As for local industrial specialization, there is also a positive impact, but 
not precisely estimated and lower than that attributed to urbanization externalities 
(1.6%).  
When we consider the informal sector in our analysis, our findings confirm that it is 
a key factor since on average workers employed in the informal sector do not enjoy 
significant benefits from agglomeration externalities. In particular, urbanization 
externalities exert a positive impact on wages, but lower than for formal workers, and 
not precisely estimated. As for local sectoral externalities, wages seem to decrease with 
the increase in the specialization level of the area, even though the effects are not 
significant.  
Finally, we further characterize the results of the analysis, by investigating the 
channels behind the detected impacts of spatial externalities on wages. We exploit the 
information derived from a panel subsample of our original data, and look into the 
matching and learning mechanisms (Combes and Gobillon, 2015; Puga, 2010). For formal 
sector workers the results show that the wage premium due to spatial externalities is 
mostly driven by better quality job matches. Nonetheless, in larger cities learning 
externalities also play an important role. As for informal sector workers, the findings are 
generally not significant. Nonetheless, they suggest a wage premium through job change 
in larger cities, while remaining employed in the same occupation entails a wage 
penalty.  
To conclude, the analysis reveals the relevance of taking into account the duality of 
the labour market in the developing countries when evaluating the impacts of spatial 
externalities. In the case of a small developing country such as Ecuador, working in the 
formal sector appears to be crucial to enjoy the high and significant benefits from 
agglomeration economies. From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that policies 
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designed to incentivize the formalization of firms might have a direct impact on 
productivity and workers’ salaries as well as represent a key channel to obtain benefits 
from agglomeration externalities. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the reference literature on 
spatial agglomeration in developed and developing countries. Section 3 describes the 
case study, presents the data and defines the main variables used for the empirical 
analysis. Section 4 illustrates the methodology, describes the empirical analysis and sets 
out the results, while Section 5 concludes.   
2. Related Literature 
The idea of agglomeration economies fostering productivity and wages has been 
widely investigated in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Two of the factors 
most frequently analyzed are urban agglomeration and local sectoral specialization.  
Marshall (1890) was a pioneer in pointing out the productivity gains that may arise 
in bigger cities or from the concentration of a specific industry in a given location. The 
channels through which this occurs, formalized by Duranton and Puga (2004), are: the 
learning mechanism, which reflects the idea of knowledge spillovers and face-to-face 
interactions in agglomerated areas that enhance human capital; the matching 
mechanism, showing that agglomerated areas offer conditions for a better match 
between workers and firms; and the sharing mechanism, lying in the advantages 
generated by sharing indivisible goods such as facilities and risk in new investments, 
thereby cutting individual and firm costs. These mechanisms lie behind both 
urbanization and specialization positive spillovers, the former being associated with 
highly dense areas, and therefore across industries, while the latter occur within specific 
industries located in the same area. 
From an empirical point of view, many works have analyzed the role of spatial 
externalities in fostering productivity and wages, using both aggregated data (see 
Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002; Combes, 2000; among others) and individual level 
data (see Combes et al., 2008; Combes et al., 2010; De la Roca and Puga, 2017; Glaeser 
and Marè, 2001; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, Matano and Naticchioni, 2012, 2016). These 
studies take into account the empirical issues that arise in identification of the role of 
such externalities. In particular, they address the endogeneity of the relationship by 
using an instrumental variable strategy, while the role of the sorting of skilled workers 
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in highly agglomerated areas is examined by means of a fixed effect strategy when using 
individual level panel data. The results have shown that worker sorting captures a large 
part of the impact imputed to spatial externalities on wages. Further, research has also 
revealed the relevance of dynamic gains in the biggest cities (De la Roca and Puga, 2017).  
However, these studies have in general been carried out on the developed countries.4  
Less attention has been paid to the role of spatial externalities in affecting wages in the 
developing countries. Nevertheless, most of the urban population growth is driven by 
the growth of cities in the developing countries and, interestingly, not in the largest cities 
(Royuela and Castells-Quintana, 2015). Thus, in line with Glaeser and Henderson (2017), 
we deem it important to study whether agglomeration economies in the developing 
countries exert the same impacts on wages and productivity as in the developed world. 
Few works have addressed this issue. Chauvin et al. (2017) use cross-sectional individual 
level data and IV estimates to analyze the difference in urbanization economies between 
similar-sized cities in the US, China, India and Brazil from 1980 to 2010. They show 
higher elasticities of wages with respect to urban density for China and India (around 
17% and 8% respectively) and lower for Brazil (2.6%), which is close to the US estimate 
(4.3%). Combes et al. (2015) focus on China and find agglomeration impacts on native 
wages within a range of 9%-12%.5 Duranton (2016), taking the case of Colombia, finds 
an elasticity of wages with respect to population size of 5%, while Ahrend et al. (2017) 
find a similar magnitude in the case of Mexico (4.2%).6  
In contrast to the works analyzing developed countries, these studies are unable to 
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity due to the lack of a longitudinal data 
structure. Nonetheless, they make use of a wide range of individual level controls to take 
into account individual heterogeneity as far as possible (see Combes and Gobillon, 2015, 
for a discussion). Furthermore, a major concern in the case of the developing countries 
                                                            
4 For an exhaustive review see Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Melo et al. (2009) and Combes and 
Gobillon (2015). 
5 They also examine the impact of sectoral specialization at the local level and find elasticities of wages 
with respect to specialization of around 6%.  
6 Note that these studies are not strictly comparable with each other, nor indeed with ours, due to the 
use of different spatial variables in each of the cited articles. For instance, Chauvin et al. (2017) 
investigate the wage impact of both density and population (or density and share of educated 
workers), while Duranton (2016) investigates the impact of density, market access and share of 
educated workers, controlling for the city area. Moreover, other related studies are Au and Henderson 
(2006), who analyze the case of China showing an inverted U relationship between wages and city 
size, and Lall et al. (2004) who, using firm-level manufacturing data, look into the role of spatial 
externalities for economic productivity in India, disentangling the sources of agglomeration economies 
between those arising at the firm level, at the industry level and at the regional level.  
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lies in the informal economy, which implies the presence of a dual labour market, 
informal workers representing around half of the labour force (La Porta and Shleifer, 
2014; Maloney, 2004; Overman and Venables, 2005). Informal labour is usually 
represented by low-educated workers (Fields, 1990; Khamis, 2012) and associated with 
high levels of vulnerability and poverty, low wages and productivity, and lack of legal 
protection (Bacchetta et al., 2009; Fields, 1990). Consequently, in our view, a thorough 
analysis of the relevance of spatial externalities in a developing economy should take 
this dimension into account (Glaeser and Henderson, 2017).  
From the theoretical point of view, the literature has yet to reach consensus on the 
relationship between agglomeration externalities and the informal economy. Overman 
and Venables (2005) discuss this issue, arguing that the informal economy might be 
expected to reduce the gains from agglomeration economies, in line with the rationale 
of the Harris-Todaro (1970) model. In particular, they stress that, according to this model, 
the urban real wage is higher than real earnings in agriculture because of institutional 
rigidities or efficiency wage considerations. This urban wage premium in turn attracts 
to the city people who seek “formal sector” jobs. Migrants who fail to enter the formal 
job sector remain unemployed or work for a significantly lower wage in the urban 
“informal sector”. This leads to the burgeoning of a mass of low-wage and low-
productivity urban labour,7 which represents a cost of urbanization, in terms of 
congestion and higher rents. As a consequence, Overman and Venables (2005) argue that 
the presence of a large pool of unemployed/underemployed workers could reduce the 
benefits from agglomeration. However, they point out that these effects may not be fast 
enough to offset the advantages deriving from agglomeration.8 Overman and Venables 
(2005) also point out that the informal sector itself could contribute to agglomeration 
economies because of the vitality of this sector, the existence of networks of small firms 
benefitting from labour market pooling and the role of the informal economy shown in 
the literature on clusters in developing countries. This spillover effect is also stressed by 
Duranton (2009), who argues that the formal and informal sectors are closely 
interconnected, so positive effects could arise within both sectors.  
                                                            
7 A similar argument is raised by Chauduri and Mukhopadhyay (2010), who stress that within dual 
economy models with an urban informal sector, the latter is viewed as a residual sector that absorbs 
all workers who did not succeed in entering the formal sector, thus offering a very low competitive 
wage (less than the rural or formal sector wage rates).  
8 This is more likely to occur for formal sector workers than for informal sector workers, the latter being 
characterized by significantly lower wages. 
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From the empirical point of view, the role of the informal economy within the relation 
between spatial externalities and wages has generally been neglected. One exception is 
Duranton (2016), who uses individual level data for Colombia to carry out an indirect 
test performing estimations of the spatial externalities’ impact on wages vis-à-vis, on the 
one hand, all workers, and on the other hand only workers with a written labour 
contract. His findings show that spatial externalities have a lower impact when only 
workers with written contracts are taken into account (around 3.7% compared to 5% for 
all workers), thus inferring higher benefits due to agglomeration economies for informal 
workers.9 
3. Description of the data and definition of variables of interest 
In this paper we focus on Ecuador, a small-sized, middle-income developing country. 
The total population size (around 16 million inhabitants) and GNP per-capita (6,000 US$ 
in 2015) are lower than the average of the developing countries.10 Also, Ecuador is ranked 
among the countries with the lowest economic complexity indexes11 and is characterized 
by low industrialization and urbanization rates as compared with other Latin America 
countries. Further, it is included in the group of countries that have gone through rapid 
urbanization since 1960.12   
We use data from the Ecuadorean Labour Surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, 
Desempleo y Subempleo - ENEMDU) provided by the National Statistics Institute of 
Ecuador (INEC). These are quarterly surveys (repeated cross-section data) that contain 
                                                            
9 Other related papers are by Garcia (2019) who, like Duranton (2016), uses individual level data to 
study the case of Colombia, finding positive agglomeration benefits (in terms of density) for the 
informal economy and negative ones for the formal economy. However, he does not analyze the 
channels behind the detected impact, which is one of the purposes of this paper. Also, Harris (2014), 
using firm level data for Nairobi’s handicraft industry, finds disadvantages in terms of agglomeration 
externalities in relation to the informal economy. Further, Bernedo Del Caprio and Patrick (2017) use 
firm level data for Peru to show lower benefits from agglomeration externalities for the informal 
economy. 
10 The average population size for the developing countries is around 56 million inhabitants, while the 
GNP per-capita was 7,346US$ in 2015. The list of developing economies is from the World Economic 
Situation and Prospects 2014, UN, Statistical Annex. Furthermore, Ecuador also has a lower GNP per 
capita than the average of the other Latin American countries (7,185 US$ in 2015), while emerging 
economies such as Colombia and Brazil show values close to or above the average (respectively 7,130 
US$ and 10,100 US$). Nonetheless, Ecuador is included in the group of upper middle-income countries 
since its GNP per-capita is higher than 3,895 US$ (World Bank). 
11 Ecuador has the third lowest level of the Economic Complexity Index in Latin America, after 
Nicaragua and Bolivia (Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT: 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/rankings/country/eci/?year_range=2011-2016).  
12 Throughout the period of the analysis (2007-2017) the urbanization process is characterized by faster 
population growth for small and median cities, with a decreasing tendency over time (Obaco and Díaz, 
2018, and Royuela and Ordóñez, 2018).   
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detailed information on Ecuadorean workers: labour income, hours worked, age, 
gender, ethnicity, education, occupation, previous migrant status and informal 
employment status. We also have information on the workers’ area/city of residence 
and sector of employment. To construct our instruments for analysis we combine these 
data with data from the population censuses of 1950 and 1990.13  
As spatial units of analysis, we use an international harmonized concept of economic 
cities, namely Functional Urban Areas (FUAs hereafter)14 as in Ahrend et al. (2017). We 
use the 28 FUAs in Ecuador identified in Obaco et al. (2019) (see Figure A1, in the 
Appendix).15 The most populated FUAs are the capital city, Quito, and Guayaquil, with 
more than 1.5 million inhabitants each, located in the Andean and Coastal region 
respectively.16 
The period of the empirical analysis is from 2007 to 2017.17 We restrict the sample to 
workers located in the FUA areas (males and females) aged between 15 and 64 years old 
who perform one job.18 We exclude workers employed in the public sector since their 
wage is set nationally, and focus on employees and self-employed workers. We clean the 
dataset by dropping observations with missing data in our variables of interest as well 
as observations below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile of the workers’ real wage 
distribution, hours worked and real wages per hour.19 We end up with a sample of 
377,273 observations for the period of analysis – around 8,800 per quarter. 
Informality is defined on the basis of the latest methodology implemented by the 
INEC (following the 2013 ILO guidelines): the informal sector includes workers 
                                                            
13 1950 saw the first population census. The data are from the National Institute of Statistics and Census 
of Ecuador (INEC). 
14 Throughout the paper we will use “Functional Urban Area“ and “city” as  synonymous.  
15 The Functional Urban Areas are defined according to the OECD methodology. First urban cores are 
identified, using satellite images, based on continuous grid cells of high population density (minimum 
500 inhabitants per km2) and total population size of at least 25,000 inhabitants. Second, a travel-time 
approach is considered to build polycentric FUAs and define their hinterlands’ boundaries. The final 
FUAs represent both the urban cores and the connected municipalities forming the hinterland.  
16 Quito and Guayaquil are the largest metropolitan FUAs. The rest of the Ecuadorian FUAs are 
medium-sized and small, with a substantial gap in terms of population with respect to the two biggest 
ones (Cuenca, the third FUA in the country, has around 500 thousand inhabitants).  
17 This time span avoids the years of the previous economic crises (the peak of the great recession was 
in 1999) and dollarization process (introduced as national currency of Ecuador in January 2000).   
18 We drop workers with more than one job (5% of total sample).  
19 We deflate wages by using the Ecuadorian national CPI. The base year is 2014. CPI information is 
provided by the Ecuadorian Central Bank. We also drop singleton group observations in terms of city-
sector-year-quarter since they cannot be used in the empirical analysis (less than 2% of sample 
observations).   
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employed in firms with fewer than 100 employees having no tax identification number 
(Registro unico del contribuyente).20 We also employ an alternative measure for informality 
associated with the worker status rather than with the firm status, taking informal 
workers to be those with no access to the social security system. In this way we are able 
to assess how the results change when taking into account informal workers employed 
in the formal sector.  
We use the following measures of agglomeration effects. First, to proxy urbanization 
externalities we use the FUA population density (Densc,t). This information is provided 
by the INEC. Moreover, we also control for the land area of the FUA as suggested in 
Combes and Gobillon (2015), since it provides additional information on urbanization 
externalities. In particular, the impact of density, keeping the FUA area constant, reflects 
the benefits arising from increasing the number of people in the city, while the impact of 
the FUA area, keeping density constant, reflects the benefits from enlarging the size of 
the city (i.e. from proportionally increasing city area and population). 
The other measure of agglomeration externalities is a specialization index, which 
proxies sector specialization at the local level. We compute it as in Combes (2000), 












,,   
where c stands for the city, s for the sector, and t for time. The specialization index is the 
ratio between the share of sectoral employment in the total employment in any city c and 
the corresponding share at the national level.21  
Table 1 presents the average of the real wages per hour (in US dollars) for the workers’ 
categories considered in the empirical analysis, at the beginning, middle and end of the 
                                                            
20 The INEC has applied different definitions of informality over time. The previous definition was 
classifying workers employed in the informal sector as those employed in firms with 10 or fewer 
employees with no full accounting records or tax identification number. The current definition (INEC, 
2015) follows the 2013 ILO guidelines and includes in the formal sector firms having tax identification 
numbers, even though they may not have full accounting records, in order to take into account cases 
where there is some legal justification. The classification divides workers into formal and informal 
sector workers, homeworkers and non-classified workers. Formal and informal workers account for 
90% of our sample, while 4% are homeworkers and 6% are non-classified workers. In the paper we 
only consider formal and informal sector workers.   
21 Sectors are defined according to the ISIC version 3.1 at two-digit level. We use the ENEMDU surveys 
to compute the specialization index.  
11 
 
period under analysis, as well as for the entire time span of the analysis (2007-2017) 
combined with their relative presence in the sample.  
Turning to the composition of the sample (Table 1, last column), it may be noted that 
males constitute around 62% of the labour force. The dominant ethnicity is mestizo 
(89%). Around 75% of the sample is constituted by low/medium-educated workers 
(educational levels are up to high school at most), while about 47% of the workers are 
employed in unskilled occupations, 38% in medium-skilled, and 15% in high-skilled 
ones. In terms of sector distribution, a relatively high percentage of workers (30%) are 
employed in the wholesale and retail trade sector and, in general, in the service sector 
(in total around 65% of workers); manufacturing, mining and agriculture account for just 
26% of the total sample of workers (16% of which in manufacturing), construction for 
9%. As for the dual labour market, workers in the informal sector represent around 37% 
of the total workforce in the sample. Also, their relative presence has been declining over 
time (from 40% in 2007 to 36% in 2017). Moreover, 43% of workers are self-employed, 
while 57% are employees. Considering the regions, 54% of the workers are located in the 
Andean region, 42% in the Coastal region, and the remaining 4% in the Amazonian 
region. Finally, 32% of the workers declare they have not always lived in the city where 
they currently reside.  
As for wages (Table 1, columns 1 to 4), a general increase in real wages per worked 
hour throughout the period analyzed may be noted. In addition, there is evidence of 
marked heterogeneity according to the dimensions considered: males earn around 9% 
more than females; white workers have a significant premium compared to the other 
ethnicities (11% above the average); wages increase with the worker’s level of education 
and job skill intensity, as well as previous migrant status of the worker. In terms of the 
dual labour market, wages are significantly higher (about 61% more) for formal than for 
informal sector workers. Further, wages are lower for the self-employed than for the 
employees. As for the economic sectors, apart from the mining and quarrying sector, 
wages are higher in the service sector than in manufacturing. In terms of regions, wages 
are higher in the Andean region followed by the Amazonian region (due to oil 
extraction).  




 4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. The impact of spatial externalities on average wages  
In this section, we use data on repeated cross-sections for Ecuador from 2007 to 2017 to 
estimate a pool cross-section model. We carry out a two-step methodology similar to 
that of Combes et al. (2008). In the first step, wages are regressed over a set of individual 
observable characteristics and a set of city-sector-time dummies. In the second step the 
time-averages of the estimated city-sector-time fixed effects are regressed over the (time-
average of the) spatial variables. More specifically, the first step is:  
titisictiti CSTAXW ic ,),(),(
''
,, **)log( )(             (1) 
where log(Wi,t) is the log of real wage per hour worked by worker i at time t. Xi,t is the 
vector of worker’s characteristics including: age, age squared, years of education, female 
dummy, migrant dummy (indicating whether the worker has previously lived 
somewhere else), five categories for ethnicities, twenty-seven categories for occupation 
(ISCO 88 at two-digit level), and job category (self-employed/employee) dummies. 
CSTc(i),s(i),t  are the city-sector-time22 dummies, while εi,t is the error term. From this first 
step regression we retrieve the estimate of the city-sector-time fixed effects and we 
compute weighted time-averages for each city-sector cell, using as weights the number 
of observations in each cell. The obtained time-averaged fixed effects are then used as 




,, *)log(*)log(*)log(*  

               (2) 
where 

scCS ,  is the vector of the time-average values of the city-sector-time fixed effects 
retrieved from equation (1), log(Densc) is the log of the time-average population density 
of city c, log(Specc,s) is the log of the time-average specialization index for city c and sector 
s, while log(Areac) is the log of the FUA’s land area. δ, θ and γ are the parameters of 
                                                            
22 Year-quarter. 
23 In the second step we use time-averaged fixed effects because intruments are time-invariant. As a 
robustness check, we have also followed an alternative estimation strategy where in the first step we 
introduce city-sector fixed effects, as well as time dummies, and retrieve the estimates of the city-sector 
fixed effects to be used as dependent variable in the second step. Results do not significantly change 
and are available upon request. 
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interest (elasticities) that capture the extent of agglomeration effects on wages. Finally, 
Ac are dummies for the three natural regions of Ecuador (Andean, Coastal and 
Amazonian) that control for differences in average wages across the regions.24  
The OLS estimation of equation (1) may be affected by two main issues. First, there 
might be sorting of skilled workers into highly agglomerated areas. In our data, we 
cannot directly address this point since we would need a panel dataset to control for 
individual unobserved heterogeneity. Nonetheless, we do our best by introducing a 
wide range of worker control variables in line with Duranton (2016) and Glaeser and 
Resseger (2010). Second, there might be a matter of endogeneity arising from the possible 
simultaneity in individual choices concerning wages and locations. We address this 
point by using an instrumental variables strategy. As instruments, we use the density 
defined using cities’ historical population (in 1950) and the degree of specialization in 
1990.25 The idea is that lagged levels of our independent variables are correlated with the 
current levels of spatial variables, but they are assumed not to influence productivity 
and wages today (Combes et al., 2008, Mion and Naticchioni, 2009).26 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of model (1). Column (1) shows the first 
step estimation, while the results for the second step estimates are presented in columns 
(2) to (7). In particular, columns (2) to (4) show the OLS estimates where we introduce 
                                                            
24 It might be argued that the introduction of regional dummies in the estimation could capture and 
blur the impacts of spatial externalities on wages, considering also the limited number of FUAs 
available in Ecuador. Nonetheless, in the case of Ecuador (as in other countries, such as Italy), the 
introduction of these dummies proves to be relevant since the country is characterized by structural 
differences across regions that are reflected in significant differences in terms of average wages, 
regardless of other factors. In particular, the Coastal region is characterized by significant lower 
average wages with respect to the other regions due to the massive migration that historically 
occurred, worsening labour market conditions, while the Amazonian region is characterized by higher 
wages due to the oil extraction activity that prevails. Besides, Ecuador has two major cities, Quito and 
Guayaquil, located in the Andean and Coastal regions respectively, which stands in the way of a major 
effect of regional dummies in capturing the impact of urban primacy. As a check, we carried out the 
empirical analysis excluding the regional dummies; the results showed lower magnitudes and 
significance levels, as well as goodness of fit, reassuring us about the importance of including these 
control dummies in the second step estimation.  
25 In order to run estimates with no more than two endogenous variables, which is already challenging 
and might make results hard to interpret, as pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2010), we decided to 
treat land area as exogenous. Nonetheless, if we instrument the land area using the core area of the 
FUAs in 1975, the results remain consistent with land area generally capturing a larger part of the 
impact of density. These estimates are available upon request.  
26 It might be argued that a lag of 17 years for the specialization variable is not sufficient for the 
instrument to be valid. Therefore, we suggest taking the results with some caution. Nonetheless, and 
reassuringly, Chauvin et al. (2017) compared IV estimates of the wage impact of spatial variables using 
as instruments either historical variables (lagged around 100 years) or more recent variables (lagged 
30 years), finding no significant differences across them. Besides, Ecuador went through a structural 
change in the ‘90s, introducing dollarization and experiencing massive international emigration.  
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the spatial variables sequentially, while column (5) to (7) show the corresponding IV 
estimates.27  
The OLS results show that the variables capturing agglomeration effects have positive 
and significant coefficients. In particular, when including density alone (column (2)), we 
find an elasticity of 7.7%, which is not affected by introduction of the specialization 
variable in the estimation (column (3)). Moreover, the elasticity of wages with respect to 
the specialization index is 3.5%. Introduction of the log of the FUA area (column (4)) 
causes a reduction of the density elasticity from 7.6% to 6.5%, while the elasticity of the 
city area stands at 2.7%, indicating that urbanization externalities are generated by both 
higher concentration of workers given the size of the area and, to a lesser extent, by 
bigger city size. When applying the IV estimates (columns (5) to (7)) the results remain 
consistent as far as urbanization externalities are concerned (elasticities of 5.4% for 
density and 2.8% for the FUA area in column (7) respectively). This is consistent with 
previous empirical findings indicating that endogeneity does not appear to be a major 
concern in analysis of the agglomeration impacts on wages (Combes et al., 2010, Matano 
and Naticchioni, 2012, Melo et al., 2009). As for specialization, the coefficient is lower in 
magnitude (between 1.6% and 2.2%) and no longer statistically significant.28  
These results indicate that urbanization externalities are at work also in a small 
developing country like Ecuador, with magnitude of impacts in line with those found 
for the emerging developing countries (see Chauvin et al., 2017; Combes et al. 2015; 
Duranton, 2016). The magnitude of the specialization index is also consistent with that 
found in other studies based on a similar definition of sector specialization at the local 
level (Matano and Naticchioni, 2012; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009).29 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
 
4.2 Agglomeration effects and informality  
                                                            
27 In the second step estimates are weighted by the time-average number of workers in each city-sector-
year-quarter cell. 
28 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the IV first stage estimates for columns (5) to (7) of Table 2.  
29 In this paper we focus on two of the main spatial externality variables – density and specialization. 
We also introduce a control for the area of the FUAs, which captures the effect on wages of the size of 
the FUAs keeping density constant. Nonetheless, there might be other spatial variables affecting 
wages, such as human capital externalities and market access. We do not insert them in the 
specification because these variables are also endogenous and we lack adequate instruments. Also, if 
treated as exogenous, they prove not to be significant due to collinearities with the density variable 
(see Table A2 in the Appendix).   
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In this section, we directly test the role of informality within the relationship between 
spatial agglomeration and wages for a developing country. We employ the estimation 
strategy shown in the previous subsection, with the difference that, in order to analyze 
the informal sector, in the first step we now introduce the city-sector-time fixed effects 
interacted with the informal dummy. This allows us to retrieve two sets of city-sector-
time fixed effects, one for each category of workers, which we use in the second step to 
run separate estimations for formal and informal workers. Table 3 shows the results of 
the second step estimation.30 31 In addition, Table A4 in the Appendix shows the same 
estimates not controlling for the individual observable characteristics in the first step, to 
check for the sorting of workers into observable characteristics for formal and informal 
sector workers. A simple comparison between Table A4 and Table 3 shows a marked 
reduction in the coefficients of the urbanization externalities variables, evidencing 
positive sorting into large and high dense cities. The extent of the reduction is 
particularly striking for formal sector workers. As for specialization, on the contrary, 
there is evidence of negative sorting particularly pronounced for informal workers. This 
means that the lowest skilled informal workers work in highly specialized areas in 
Ecuador. 
Having controlled for the sorting of workers, we now go on to discuss the results of 
Table 3. Columns (1) to (3) present the second step estimates by OLS, where spatial 
variables are again added incrementally, while columns (4) to (6) show the 
corresponding IV estimates. 
The OLS estimates indicate that the previous results essentially concerned formal 
sector workers, whose elasticities with respect to the spatial variables proved positive 
and significant in both the OLS and IV estimates. In particular, in the IV estimates the 
elasticities for density and city area stand at 4.8% and 4.3% respectively, while the 
specialization elasticity stands at 3.6% (top panel of Table 3, column (6)). As for the 
informal sector workers (bottom panel of Table 3), there is evidence of positive and 
marginally significant urbanization externalities due to density in OLS estimates 
                                                            
30 For the sake of space, we do not show the results of the first step estimation of Table 3, which is 
qualitatively the same as the one shown in Table 2. The only difference is that some singleton group 
observations are now dropped from the estimation, because fixed effects are distinguished by formal 
and informal sector workers’ status. Hence, the first step estimation uses 372,439 observations. These 
estimates are available upon request. The same will also apply to the next estimates, with no significant 
changes in the first step results. Also, the number of observations in the second step will be accordingly 
reduced.  
31 Table A3 in the Appendix show the IV first stage estimates for columns (4) to (6) of Table 3. 
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(elasticity of 3.6% in column (3)) which, however, turn out not to be precisely estimated 
in the IV regressions. Besides, the coefficients for the other spatial variables are not 
significant in both the OLS and IV estimates. These results show that workers employed 
in the informal sector do not enjoy the same benefits from agglomeration externalities as 
formal sector workers.  
[Table 3 around here] 
 
So far, we have defined informality from the firm point of view, taking informal 
workers to be those employed in the informal sector, i.e., in firms with fewer than 100 
employees and with no tax identification number. However, informality can also be 
defined from the worker point of view. As an alternative definition for informality, we 
now take informal workers to be those who do not have access to the social security 
system (No-SS). Consequently, there is a possibility for informal workers to be employed 
in the formal sector.32 We modify the previous specification by introducing in the first 
step city-sector-time fixed effects interacted with both the informal sector dummy and 
the No-SS dummy. As in the case of the analysis for informality, we retrieve city-sector-
time fixed effects for formal sector workers with and without access to the social security 
system, and we run separate estimations for these categories of workers. In this way, we 
are able to assess whether there are differences in the benefits of spatial externalities 
between formal and informal workers who are employed in the formal sector. Table 4 
shows the results. The top panel presents the second-step results for workers with access 
to the social security system, while the bottom panel presents the results for workers 
with no access to the social security system. The results show small and non-significant 
differences in the gains from spatial externalities between formal workers and informal 
workers employed in the formal sector. Interestingly, informal workers show slightly 
higher point estimates. Hence, the lack of benefits from agglomeration externalities 
concerns only informal workers employed in the informal sector.33 
These findings show that the relevant dimension of informality to take into account 
when evaluating the differential impact of agglomeration economies on wages is the 
                                                            
32 Workers with no access to the social security system constitute around 58% of the total sample. Of 
these, 43% are employed in the formal sector.  
33 The latter results are somewhat in line with the findings of Duranton (2016), who detects higher 




type of sector where the workers are employed. This outcome could be related to both 
specific characteristics of the formal sector, which allow workers to better exploit the 
benefits of agglomeration externalities (bigger firms, higher level of human capital, 
higher level of productivity and technology, better links across firms, etc..) and to 
specific characteristics of the informal workers employed in the formal sector, which 
make them better able to reap the benefits of agglomeration economies (such as higher 
education and skill levels).34   
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Summing up, these results show that informal workers employed in the informal sector 
do not enjoy the same wage premium from agglomeration externalities as formal and 
informal workers employed in the formal sector. One explanation for these findings 
might be an education effect, considering that the more educated workers (both formal 
and informal) are more likely to be employed in the formal sector.35 Hence, evidence of 
higher returns to agglomeration externalities for the more educated workers might (at 
least in part) account for the higher returns to spatial externalities for formal sector 
workers that we detected. We directly test this hypothesis. Applying our two-step 
empirical strategy and interacting, now, the city-sector-time fixed effects with a dummy 
for high education in the first step, we test whether in Ecuador there is evidence of higher 
returns to agglomeration externalities for more educated workers. We also test this 
hypothesis considering separately formal and informal workers (Table A5 in the 
Appendix). When considering all the workers, the second-step results show that high-
educated workers enjoy higher benefits from spatial externalities. However, these 
findings concern only workers employed in the formal sector, while for the informal 
sector we fail to detect any significant impact of agglomeration economies on wages for 
                                                            
34 In particular, in our sample it is possible to observe positive sorting of informal workers into the 
formal sector, since the average years of education are 11.5 for informal workers employed in the 
formal sector and 9.4 for informal workers employed in the informal sector (while the average comes 
to 12.7 years for the formal workers).  
35 High-educated workers are defined as workers with a level of education above high school (i.e. 
technical, university and post-university education). They account for 25% of the sample. Moreover, 
in our sample, 86% of the high-educated workers are employed in the formal sector, while the 
proportion is just 55% for the low-educated workers. Besides, 23% of the informal workers and 42% of 
the formal workers employed in the formal sector are highly educated.  
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either high- or low-educated workers.36 Hence, education does not seem to be a driver 
of our findings.  
We will now go on to present a more detailed picture of the mechanisms through 
which agglomeration externalities impact on formal and informal workers’ wages.  
4.3 Analysis of the channels of the spatial wage premium: matching, learning and 
informality 
In this section, we aim to shed light on the channels behind the impacts found so far for 
formal and informal sector workers: we analyze the role of matching and learning 
mechanisms in the spatial wage dynamics (Combes and Gobillon, 2015; Puga, 2010). To 
this end, we make use of the data of a panel subsample of our original dataset. The 
ENEMDU survey is designed to sample families living in specific buildings/dwellings 
(viviendas), resampling of 25% of them being performed quarterly, following a 2-2-2 
panel structure: a building/dwelling may be sampled for two consecutive quarters, then 
left for the two successive quarters, and subsequently again sampled for two more 
quarters. This means that if a family has not moved house, it could be interviewed at 
most four times, covering a total time span of six quarters. We take the opportunity of 
the survey structure to identify working members of households sampled more than 
once and analyze their wage dynamics.37 As in the previous sections, we focus on 
workers aged between 15-64 while eliminating outliers38 and extreme observations in 
terms of real wages, hours worked and real wages per hour worked. With this 
procedure, we arrive at a panel of 81,533 observations for 39,294 workers residing in the 
same place.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the channels behind the spatial 
wage premium have been analyzed for a developing country by means of an individual 
panel dataset. Nonetheless, we must point out that the results of this analysis are limited 
                                                            
36 It is worth noting that the number of high-educated informal sector workers is relatively low (14% 
of high-educated workers), and therefore the analysis is carried out over a lower number of 
observations compared to the other estimates. Hence, these estimates have to be taken somewhat 
gingerly.  
37 More specifically, in order to identify household persons interviewed more than once, we select the 
persons living in the same building/dwelling –included in the panel subsample-, belonging to the 
same family, having the same position inside the family, with same sex, ethnicity, birth city and 
(should he/she have previously migrated) reporting the same city as the last place he/she has been 
living in.  
38 In particular, we identify outlier workers as those reporting data non-consistent over time regarding 
age, education, gender and previous migration status.  
19 
 
to the short-run outcomes of the wage dynamics of stayers. Besides, we suggest taking 
these results with some caution due to the relatively small size of the sample.  
We investigate whether the wage premium due to spatial externalities in the short 
run can be attributable to better job-matches between workers and firms or to learning 
mechanisms generated while remaining employed in the same job category. To analyze 
this issue, we use the data on the specific type of occupation of the worker, as we cannot 
know whether he or she remains in or changes firm. Therefore, our analysis evaluates 
the impact on wages of a change in type of occupation, which may well proxy a better 
match between workers and firms in terms of tasks, while not addressing the impact of 
job change across firms within the same occupation, which might reflect a better match 
in terms of alternative dimensions, such as wages, working conditions, etc. The focus of 
our analysis lies, then, in detection of a wage premium derived from a specific matching 
linked to the type of occupation, which may occur across firms and also within a firm. 
We build a dummy signalling job-change with a value equal to 1 when a worker changes 
occupation, considering 2-digit level occupations defined according to the ISCO88 
classification. We employ the same estimation strategy used in the first part of the 
analysis, where now in the first step the city-sector-time fixed effects are interacted with 
both the informal sector dummy and a job-change dummy. We then retrieve city-sector-
time fixed effects estimates for formal and informal sector workers, whether 
experiencing a job change or not, and use them to run the second step separately for each 
category of worker. 
With this specification we can see whether wages react positively to a change in 
occupation, thus suggesting that the wage increases due to a better quality match, or if 
they increase when remaining employed in the same kind of occupation, pointing to the 
presence of learning effects.39 In addition, we decided to focus on workers not moving 
between formal and informal sectors when going through job change. In this way we 
avoid confusing the impact of an occupation change with that of a change in formality 
status.40   
Table 5 shows the results. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the second step IV 
estimates for workers who change job, while columns (4), (5) and (6) present the second 
                                                            
39 As for descriptive job change statistics, it is worth noting that around half the job changes for both 
formal and informal sector workers represent an upgrade in the occupational position. 
40 Observations accounting for workers who move from the formal to the informal sector or the other 
way around represent 15% of the total number of observations. We carried out a robustness check 
using all sample observations and the results remain robust. We do not show these estimates for the 
sake of conciseness. They are available upon request.  
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step IV estimates for those who do not change job.41 Moreover, the top panel of Table 5 
presents the results for formal sector workers, the bottom panel for informal sector 
workers.42 
As for the formal sector workers, job-quality match appears to be a relevant channel 
for their wage increase. In fact, the elasticities of wage with respect to both urbanization 
externalities (density and area) and specialization are positive, significant and high in 
magnitude. In particular, in column (3) they come to 10% for density, 12.6% for 
specialization and 6.9% for city area. Considering the wage change when the worker 
remains employed in the same kind of occupation (top panel of Table 5, columns (4) to 
(6)), there is evidence of a wage premium due to urbanization externalities. However, it 
is lower in magnitude with respect to the one detected for job changes (elasticity of 6.4% 
for density in column (5), absorbed by the city area effect in column (6)). Hence, in more 
urbanized areas job changes entail a higher wage premium compared to remaining in 
the same job for formal sector workers, while agglomeration advantages resulting from 
sectoral specialization are only achieved through job changes. This outcome points to 
the matching channel as the most important factor behind the urban wage premium for 
this category of workers. Nonetheless, there is also evidence of learning effects in the 
bigger cities.  
As for the informal sector workers, job-quality match also seems to be relevant, since 
the estimates are positive and high in magnitude for urbanization externalities. 
However, they are never precisely estimated, probably due to the limited sample size. 
On the contrary, remaining employed in the same occupation (bottom panel of Table 5, 
columns (4) to (6)) entails a wage penalty with respect to both the specialization and 
density variables. This could be related to the presence of an excessive mass of informal 
sector workers in larger areas, à la Harris-Todaro (Overman and Venables, 2005) and/or, 
with regard to specialization, to the negative sorting of informal workers we detected. 
 [Table 5 around here] 
                                                            
41 We do not show the first-step estimates for the sake of space. They are qualitatively the same as 
previous estimates. They are available upon request.  
42 There was an interruption in the ISCO data classification between 2012 and 2013. We therefore 
mapped the ISCO08 classification into the ISCO88 classification for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. Since 
we estimate the impact of a job change on wages according to ISCO classification, we decided to run 
a robustness check using the original ISCO classification (ISCO88 up to 2012 and ISCO08 as from 2013) 
to compute the job change, while at the same time excluding the observations affected during the 
change period. The results are shown in Table A6 in the Appendix and remain robust to the 




To sum up, analysis of the channels through which spatial wage premiums arise 
shows a difference between workers employed in the formal and informal sectors. As 
for the formal sector workers, urbanization externality impacts are driven by a better 
quality of job matching and, to a lesser extent, by positive learning externalities. Sectoral 
specialization at the local level entails a wage premium only through job changes. For 
the informal sector workers, the overall results suggest that the non-significant impact 
detected in the first part of the analysis for urbanization externalities may be due to a 
balancing effect between a wage premium due to job changes (even if not precisely 
estimated) and a wage penalty for remaining employed in the same job. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have explored the role of agglomeration economies on the wages of 
workers for a small-sized, middle-income developing country, Ecuador. We have found 
positive and significant impacts on wages deriving from spatial agglomeration. In 
particular, the elasticity of wages with respect to density is as great as 7.1%, partly 
captured by the size of the area effect. The elasticity of wages with respect to 
specialization is 1.6%. Moreover, we have also addressed the role of the informal 
economy in this relationship, analyzing the heterogeneity of the spatial wage premium 
across formal and informal sector workers in order to take into account the interaction 
between spatial agglomeration and the presence of a dual labour market – a common 
characteristic of most developing countries. Our findings show that informal sector 
workers are penalized, since the benefits accruing from spatial externalities are low and 
insignificant. The same does not apply when considering informal workers employed in 
the formal sector, for whom we detect a non-significant difference in the spatial wage 
premium with respect to formal workers. The latter outcome might be related to the 
characteristics of the formal sector, which enhances the workers’ capacity to reap the 
benefits of agglomeration economies.  
Furthermore, we also sought to identify the channels through which these wage gains 
occur across worker categories. The results show evidence of higher gains deriving from 
better job match in denser, larger and more specialized cities for formal sector workers. 
There is also evidence of positive learning externalities in the bigger cities. As for the 
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informal sector workers, there seems to be evidence of some gains from job changes in 
larger cities, which counterbalance a wage penalty when not changing occupation.  
From a policy perspective, these findings suggest the need to design policies to 
facilitate the process of formalization of firms, which might well be a key factor in 
increasing workers’ productivity and wages, and to allow for significant benefits from 
spatial externalities. Our findings also point to the costs associated with agglomeration 
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Worker data 2007 2012 2017 All % 
Total 2.20 2.29 2.61 2.37 100
Gender      
Male 2.24 2.39 2.68 2.45 61.65
Female 2.14 2.14 2.49 2.24 38.35
Ethnicity
Indigenous 1.68 1.89 1.89 1.79 4.39
White 2.54 2.93 3.19 2.64 3.24
Mestizo* 2.22 2.31 2.66 2.40 88.61
Black 1.63 1.98 2.24 2.02 2.43
Mulatos** 1.71 1.94 2.11 2.00 1.33
Education level
At Most Literacy 1.42 1.65 1.74 1.47 0.28
School 1.62 1.84 2.00 1.81 30.55
High School 2.00 2.13 2.37 2.18 43.68
Technical 2.57 2.61 3.02 2.89 1.40
University 3.22 3.07 3.62 3.32 23.17
Post-Univ. Degree 5.67 4.79 6.13 5.72 0.91
Occupation 
Legislators, Professionals and Technicians 3.74 3.60 4.35 3.98 14.41Clerks, Service Workers and Skilled 
Agricultural and Fishery Workers 2.03 2.19 2.40 2.20 38.36Crafts and Trade Workers, Plant and 
Machine Operators, Elementary Occupations 1.84 1.97 2.22 2.01 47.23
Job Category (1)
Dependent workers 2.12 2.38 2.80 2.49 56.67
Self-employed 2.31 2.19 2.38 2.22 43.33
Job Category (2)
Formal Sector Workers 2.53 2.62 3.04 2.76 62.95
Informal Sector Workers 1.71 1.72 1.84 1.71 37.05
Economic Sector
Agriculture, Fishing 1.72 1.91 2.02 1.87 8.62
Mining and Quarrying 4.09 3.85 4.24 4.27 0.47
Manufacturing 2.16 2.27 2.63 2.34 16.37
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 3.69 2.98 2.68 3.10 0.11
Construction 2.08 2.24 2.43 2.28 9.18
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.11 2.18 2.48 2.25 29.61
Hotels and Restaurants 2.13 2.25 2.44 2.26 7.39
Transport, Storage and Communications 2.23 2.35 2.52 2.36 9.80
Financial Intermediation 3.74 3.61 4.59 3.98 1.56
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 2.63 2.68 3.01 2.80 6.93
Private Education, Health and Social Work 2.83 2.91 3.65 3.20 5.51
Other Service Activities 1.98 1.92 2.47 2.11 4.45
Region
Andean 2.38 2.35 2.80 2.53 53.90
Coastal 1.99 2.22 2.37 2.15 41.90
Amazonian 2.18 2.44 2.34 2.45 4.21
Migrant 
Yes 2.26 2.36 2.61 2.44 32.53
No 2.17 2.26 2.60 2.34 67.47
Total Obs. 20,213 30,423 41,783 377,273
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Real Wage per Hour and Sample Composition by Worker Categories
Mean Real Wage per Hour (US dollars)
Notes: Occupation is defined according to ISCO88, sector according to ISIC 3.1. *Mestizo is the category for mixed








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Log(Density) 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.054***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Log(Specialization) 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.022 0.016














Job category dummies yes
Occupation dummies yes
City*sector*time dummies yes
Regional dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 377,273 904 904 904 904 904 904
R-squared 0.342 0.170 0.185 0.210 0.170 0.183 0.203
Weak identification test (F-value) 388.5 129.6 138.2
Table 2: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables. Dependent variable in the first step:
log of real worker's wage per hour.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In the first step
occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. In the second step, the
dependent variable is the weighted time-average of the city-sector-time fixed effects retrieved from the first step, weighted by the
number of observations in each cell. Independent variables in the second step are the time-average values of the spatial variables.
In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization level in the 1990. Estimates are weighted










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Formal sector workers
Log(Density) 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.056*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.048***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Log(Specialization) 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.036**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
Log(Area) 0.042*** 0.043***
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 843 843 843 843 843 843
R-squared 0.123 0.140 0.188 0.123 0.140 0.188
Weak identification test (F-value) 513.6 132.1 155.3
Log(Density) 0.038* 0.039* 0.036* 0.031 0.030 0.024
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022)
Log(Specialization) 0.004 0.004 -0.012 -0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Log(Area) 0.010 0.011
(0.015) (0.014)
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.016
Weak identification test (F-value) 264.4 122.4 187.1
Informal sector workers
Table 3: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables and informal sector.
Dependent variable in the first step: log of real worker's wage per hour.
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In the 
first step occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. In
the second step, the dependent variable is the weighted time average of the city-sector-informality-time fixed effects
retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent variables in the second
step are the time-average values of the spatial variables. Three regional indicators (Andean, Coastal and Amazonian)
are also included. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization level in the




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Formal sector workers with access to the social security system 
Log(Density) 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.031**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Log(Specialization) 0.023* 0.022* 0.028* 0.022
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
Log(Area) 0.024*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 733 733 733 733 733 733
Weak identification test (F-value) 574.9 112.9 125.2
Formal sector workers with no access to the social security system 
Log(Density) 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.042**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Log(Specialization) 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.050** 0.043**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020)
Log(Area) 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 664 664 664 664 664 664
Weak identification test (F-value) 447.3 109.7 122.0
Table 4: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables, informal sector and access to the social security system.
Dependent variable in the first step: log of real worker's wage per hour.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In the first step occupation is codified
according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. In the second step, the dependent variable is the weighted time average
of the city-sector-informality-no_ss-time fixed effects retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent
variables in the second step are the time-average values of the spatial variables. Three regional indicators (Andean, Coastal and Amazonian) are also
included. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization level in the 1990. Estimates are weighted using as weights


























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Formal sector workers 
Log(Density) 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.102* 0.068* 0.064* 0.030
(0.057) (0.052) (0.057) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Log(Specialization) 0.125** 0.126*** 0.026 0.018
(0.052) (0.049) (0.030) (0.031)
Log(Area) 0.069*** 0.063***
(0.022) (0.015)
Observations 258 258 258 301 301 301
Weak identification test (F-value) 219.3 118.2 114.0 258.9 97.9 118.0
Informal sector workers 
Log(Density) 0.143 0.126 0.074 -0.069 -0.087 -0.110**
(0.102) (0.112) (0.101) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Log(Specialization) -0.049 -0.057 -0.154*** -0.160***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.051) (0.053)
Log(Area) 0.065 0.038
(0.044) (0.024)
Observations 125 125 125 177 177 177
Weak identification test (F-value) 72.0 34.1 35.5 132.8 73.7 71.2
Table 5: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables, informal sector and job changes.
Dependent variable in the first step: log of real worker's wage per hour.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In the first
step occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. In the second
step, the dependent variable is the weighted time average of the city-sector-informality-job change-time fixed effects
retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent variables in the second step
are the time-average values of the spatial variables. Three regional indicators (Andean, Coastal and Amazonian) are also
included. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization level in the 1990. Estimates
are weighted using as weights the average number of individuals in each city-sector-informality-job change cell. 








Figure A1. FUAs in Ecuador ( 
 
 



























Table A1: First stage estimates of Table 2: Columns (5) to (7)
Column (5)
Dependent Variable log(Dens) log(Dens) log(Spec) log(Dens) log(Spec)
Log(Density 1950) 0.464*** 0.463*** -0.035** 0.457*** -0.022
(0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017)
Log(Specialization 1990) 0.018 0.593*** 0.015 0.599***




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Log(Density) 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.053**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.026)
Log(Specialization) 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.015 0.016 0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log(Area) 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Share of high-educated workers -0.122 -0.121 -0.047 -0.046
(0.097) (0.097) (0.127) (0.130)
Log(Market access) -0.010 -0.009 -0.023 -0.021
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027)
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 904
R-squared 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.205 0.203 0.204
Weak identification test (F-value) 89.62 124.2 72.54
Table A2: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables. Dependent variable: log of
real worker's wage per hour. Additional control variables: market access and share of high-
educated workers.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In the
first step occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. In the
second step, the dependent variable is the weighted time-average of the city-sector-time fixed effects retrieved from the
first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent variables in the second step are the time-
average values of the spatial variables. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the
specialization level in the 1990. Estimates are weighted using as weights the average number of individuals in each city-
sector cell. Market access is defined as the weighted average of cities’ income (average wage of the FUA multiplied by
population in the FUA), weighted by the inverse of the distance between FUA’s, while the share of high-educated workers










Table A3: First stage estimates of Table 3: Columns (4) to (6)
Column 
Dependent Variable log(Pop) log(Pop) log(Spec) log(Pop) log(Spec)
Log(Density 1950) 0.451*** 0.446*** -0.025 0.439*** -0.012
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Log(Specialization 1990) 0.039** 0.594*** 0.035* 0.603***
(0.018) (0.036) (0.018) (0.035)
Log(Area) 0.029 -0.053***
(0.021) (0.016)
Log(Density 1950) 0.462*** 0.462*** -0.047** 0.461*** -0.040*
(0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.022)
Log(Specialization 1990) 0.003 0.610*** 0.003 0.613***














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Formal sector workers
Log(Density) 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.103*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.121***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Log(Specialization) 0.020 0.020 -0.009 -0.022
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Log(Area) 0.060*** 0.058***
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 843 843 843 843 843 843
R-squared 0.146 0.148 0.202 0.144 0.141 0.191
Weak identification test (F-value) 513.6 132.1 155.3
Log(Density) 0.061** 0.060** 0.055** 0.052* 0.049 0.038
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027)
Log(Specialization) -0.017 -0.017 -0.060** -0.064**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
Log(Area) 0.019 0.021
(0.018) (0.017)
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.028 0.020 0.012 0.016
Weak identification test (F-value) 264.4 122.4 187.1
Table A4: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables and informal sector. No
individual covariates at the first step. Dependent variable in the first step: log of real worker's
wage per hour. 
Informal sector workers
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In
the first step occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level.
In the second step, the dependent variable is the weighted time average of the city-sector-informality-time fixed effects
retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent variables in the second
step are the time-average values of the spatial variables. Three regional indicators (Andean, Coastal and Amazonian)
are also included. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization level in the






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step







Log(Density) 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.062*** 0.054** -0.065
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.051)
Log(Specialization) 0.040 0.025 0.022 -0.016
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.069)
Log(Area) 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.027
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020)
Observations 643 643 643 613 286
Weak identification test (F-value) 475.5 113.8 118.3 110.3 70.6
Log(Density) 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.035** 0.043*** 0.028
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
Log(Specialization) 0.015 0.010 0.044** -0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
Log(Area) 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.011
(0.009) (0.007) (0.014)
Observations 837 837 837 753 583
Weak identification test (F-value) 360.6 134.7 140.1 158.3 194.4
Table A5: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables and education. Dependent




Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In the
first step occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. In
the second step, the dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the weighted time average of the city-sector-high
education-time fixed effects retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell, while the
dependent variable in columns (4) to (5) is the weighted time average of the city-sector-high education-informality-time 
fixed effects retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent variables in
the second step are the time-average values of the spatial variable. Three regional indicators (Andean, Coastal and
Amazonian) are also included. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization
level in the 1990. Estimates are weighted using as weights the average number of individuals in each city-sector-high




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step 2nd step
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Formal sector workers 
Log(Density) 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.103** 0.072* 0.069* 0.036
(0.050) (0.045) (0.047) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Log(Specialization) 0.091** 0.089** 0.017 0.009
(0.043) (0.040) (0.030) (0.031)
Log(Area) 0.067*** 0.059***
(0.019) (0.015)
Observations 260 260 260 294 294 294
Weak identification test (F-value) 201.5 114.9 110.4 247.2 98.7 118.8
Informal sector workers 
Log(Density) 0.112 0.106 0.058 -0.051 -0.069 -0.094*
(0.103) (0.111) (0.100) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
Log(Specialization) -0.021 -0.030 -0.152** -0.159***
(0.076) (0.078) (0.060) (0.062)
Log(Area) 0.064 0.045*
(0.046) (0.025)
Observations 128 128 128 175 175 175
Weak identification test (F-value) 74.0 35.9 37.2 127.9 67.9 65.7
Table A6: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables, informal sector and job
changes. Original ISCO codification and excluding individuals during the change in ISCO
versions. Dependent variable in the first step: log of real worker's wage per hour.
Job change No job change
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include a constant term. In
the first step occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level.
In the second step, the dependent variable is the weighted time average of the city-sector-informality-job change-time
fixed effects retrieved from the first step, weighted by the number of observations in each cell. Independent variables
in the second step are the time-average values of the spatial variables. Three regional indicators (Andean, Coastal and
Amazonian) are also included. In the IV estimates instruments are population density in 1950 and the specialization
level in the 1990. Estimates are weighted using as weights the average number of individuals in each city-sector-
informality-job change cell. 
